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The Anatomy of Absenteeism
*
 
Based on comprehensive administrative register data from Norway, we examine the 
determinants of sickness absence behavior; in terms of employee characteristics workplace 
characteristics, panel doctor characteristics, and economic conditions. The analysis is based 
on a novel concept of a worker’s steady state sickness absence propensity, computed from a 
multivariate hazard rate model designed to predict the incidence and the duration of sickness 
absence for all workers. Key conclusions are i) that most of the cross-sectional variation in 
absenteeism is caused by genuine employee heterogeneity; ii) that the identity of a person’s 
panel doctor has a significant impact on absence propensity; iii) that sickness absence 
insurance is frequently certified for reasons other than sickness; and iv) that the recovery rate 
rises enormously just prior to the exhaustion of sickness insurance benefits. 
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1.  Introduction 
It is a well known fact that the level of sickness absence varies substantially across time 
and space; see Bonato and Lusinyan (2004). Economists have tended to focus on the fi-
nancial incentives provided by sickness insurance institutions and their interaction with 
employment protection legislation and cyclical fluctuations when explaining trends and 
disparities in absenteeism; see, e.g., Henrekson and Persson (2004), Ichino and Riphahn 
(2005), Ruhm (2000), and Johansson and Palme (2002) for recent evidence. Yet, al-
though the disincentive effects arising from social insurance have been convincingly es-
tablished empirically, policy makers in many welfare state economies remain hesitant 
towards fundamental reform. Apparently, the welfare gains associated with income secu-
rity and equality are considered sufficient to justify the costs arising from a higher level 
of absenteeism.  
This statement certainly applies for Norway. On a typical working day, around 
seven per cent of Norwegian employees are absent from work due to sickness. Their in-
surance coverage is 100 percent of regular earnings from the first day of absence. In total, 
the resultant insurance payments amount to approximately 2.4 per cent of the Norwegian 
GDP. Hence, the costs associated with sickness absence – in terms of forgone labor sup-
ply as well as direct insurance payments – are substantial. Yet, a reduction of the re-
placement ratio is not on the political agenda. This does not imply that the problems as-
sociated with high absenteeism pass unrecognized. But rather than trading off lower ab-
senteeism against poorer insurance coverage, policy makers have aimed at shifting the 
tradeoff locus itself. Their primary means have been to overhaul the absence certification 
regulations and to encourage firms to make workplace environments more “inclusive”. 
These policies have been motivated by the observations that more than 85 percent of 
sickness absence is certified by a physician, and that absenteeism varies a lot across time, 
workplaces, and panel doctor patient lists, despite the lack of variation in financial incen-
tives. Figure 1 illustrates the point. The upper panel shows the evolvement of aggregate 
certified (lasting more than three days) and non-certified absence rates over time from 
2001 through 2005. Absenteeism apparently trended slightly upwards until 2004, after 
which the certified absence rate declined sharply. The conspicuous decline in 2004 coin-
cided with a revision of the guidelines regulating the physicians’ certification of absence 
spells, emphasizing that sickness is not a sufficient conditions for absence and that activ-
ity is normally preferable to rest during longer-term sickness periods.   4























(a) Quarterly absence rate 2001-2005
 
 























(b) Distribution of absence rates between workplaces
 
 























(c) Distribution of absence rates between panel doctors
Self-reported
Certified by panel doctor
 
Figure 1: Absenteeism in Norway: Panel (a) displays aggregate quarterly absence rate 2001-2005. 
Panel (b) displays the distribution of mean certified absence rates 2001-2005 within firms (>100 em-
ployees) and panel doctor patient lists (>100 employed patients). 
Sources: Panel a: Statistics Norway; Panels b and c: Own calculations based on merged register data (see 
Section 2 of this paper). 
 
The lower panels show the distributions of mean certified absence rates over all 
these five years by workplaces and panel doctors (conditional on at least 100 employees 
or 100 employed patients), respectively. The variation is indeed substantial. For example, 
while workplaces in the 10
th percentile of the firms’ absence rate distribution on average 
had absence rates around 3.1 percent, workplaces in the 90
th percentile had absence rates 
around 11.0 percent. The corresponding numbers for panel doctors were 3.0 and 10.3 
percent. Now, absence variation across time and space reflects a combination of at least 
three types of factors: i) genuine randomness, ii) nonrandom sorting of employees and 
common confounding factors, and iii) causal impacts of the factors in question. In order 
to identify the potential for policy intervention it is necessary to disentangle the contribu-
tions from each of these components.  
The aim of this paper is to examine the origins of the observed variation in absen-
teeism in Norway across time and space. Norway is an interesting case to study for a 
number of reasons; the absence rate is extremely high and variable, the sickness insur-
ance system is extremely generous, and the available data are extremely informative. In 
this study we use complete register data for all certified absence spells in Norway – their 
starting dates, their stopping dates, and their outcomes – from 2001 through 2005. The 
starting point of our dataset corresponds to the introduction of the panel doctor system in 
Norway, whereby each citizen was assigned to a single General Practitioner (GP). Our   5
dataset includes the linkage between citizens and GP’s on a monthly basis, as well as in-
formation about citizens and physicians. It also includes the linkage between workers and 
workplaces. The data allow us to examine the sources of variation in sickness absence 
propensity due to individual factors (gender, age, family situation, work-hours, tenure, 
nationality, education/occupation, income, social background, wealth, family events, 
etc.), workplace-characteristics (industry, size, turnover, downsizing, employee-
composition), the local economic environment (job-finding rate, employment rate), panel 
doctor characteristics (age, gender, specialization, number of patients, deviation from de-
sired number of patients, degree of competition), time trends, seasonal fluctuations, and 
institutional characteristics (system reform).  
Although there is a vast existing literature regarding various determinants of sick-
ness absence behavior, we are not aware of any previous studies aiming at a comprehen-
sive quantitative decomposition of the kind offered in this paper. This also implies that 
appropriate decomposition tools need to be developed. Hence, the paper provides novel 
contributions both to the methodology of sickness absence decomposition and to the 
more substantive issue of quantifying the key determinants of sickness absence behavior 
in a modern welfare state. We model individual absence behavior by means of a multi-
variate hazard rate model, accounting for the incidence as well as the recovery from two 
different types of absence spells – minor and major – distinguished on the basis of medi-
cal diagnosis. The model is estimated by means of the nonparametric maximum likeli-
hood estimator (NPMLE). The resultant predicted hazard rate profiles are subsequently 
used to compute each employee’s steady state absence rate, i.e., the absence rate that can 
be expected to prevail in the long run. 
  Our main findings are as follows: First, the longitudinal variation in absenteeism 
observed between 2001 and 2005 is to a limited extent explained by sorting into and out 
of the workforce. Individual absenteeism is changeable, and the 2004 reform in the ab-
sence certification regulations – with larger emphasis on work-attendance during sickness 
episodes – did cause a significant drop in absence rates. Second, even though roughly 
half of the variation in absenteeism between workplaces is accounted for by employee 
sorting, substantial workplace-differences remain. Workplace environments do have a 
considerable impact on absenteeism, and we find indications that differences between 
workplaces to some extent are amplified by social interaction processes among col-
leagues. Third, the variation in absenteeism between employees listed with different 
panel doctors does not primarily result from systematic employee sorting. The upshot is   6
that panel doctors’ certification practices vary substantially, and that these practices are 
important for actual absence decisions. Fourth, in accordance with existing evidence, we 
find that absence behavior is responsive towards employees’ financial incentives. In par-
ticular, we identify a dramatic rise in recovery rates when the generous sickness benefit 
insurance is exhausted after one year of absence. Finally, although we show that observed 
employee characteristics – such as age, gender, social background, family situation, edu-
cation, and occupation – all have substantial impacts on absence behavior, we conclude 
that unobserved differences in individual absence propensities are extremely important 
for understanding the observed cross-sectional variation in absence  behavior. In the long 
run, we find that such unobserved factors explain as much as two thirds of the overall 
variance in individual absence rates. 
  The next section gives a brief description of the data and of the institutional cir-
cumstances from which they are generated. Section 3 presents our empirical methodol-
ogy, Section 4 presents the estimation results, and Section 5 translates the estimation re-
sults into a distribution of steady state absence rates and provides a variance decomposi-
tion of these rates. Section 6 concludes. 
2.  Data and institutions 
The data we use in this paper comprise starting dates and stopping dates for all certified 
sickness absence spells in Norway during the period from June 2001 to December 2005. 
They also include the medical reason for each absence spell (diagnosis), the (encrypted) 
identity of the physician responsible for its certification, and the (encrypted) identity of 
each citizen’s panel doctor.
1 The data on absence spells are merged with a number of 
other administrative data registers providing detailed information about individual em-
ployees, their panel doctors, their workplaces, and the institutional and economic envi-
ronments they face.  
  The starting point of our empirical analysis is the population at risk of becoming 
absent from work in June 2001 – one month after the panel doctor reform was imple-
mented in Norway. To start with, our analysis population consists of all employed indi-
viduals in Norway aged 30-60 at this point in time. After that, new individuals are in-
                                                 
1 A large fraction of absence spells are (initially) certified by a physician other than the individ-
ual’s own panel doctor (e.g., by casualty units). However, to the extent that the absence spell lasts more 
than a few days, certification renewals will typically be taken care of by the panel doctor. 
   7
cluded in the dataset as they become 30 years and/or become employed. Individuals are 
removed from the dataset (censored) as they become 61 years or non-employed. Hence, 
at any point in time during 2001-2005, our analysis population consists of all employed 
individuals in Norway aged 30-60. In total 1.78 million individuals – and 3.7 million ab-
sence spells – are included.  
Norwegian employees are normally paid their regular salary during sickness ab-
sence for up to one year; i.e., there is a 100 percent replacement ratio. During the first 16 
days of absence, the expenses are covered by the employer, after which the social secu-
rity system foots the bill.
2 The general rule is that absence spells lasting more than three 
days must be certified by a physician. However, certification is not required until the 9
th 
day for employees in firms participating in a tripartite “inclusive workplace agreement” 
(IWA) between employers, employees and the state.
3 Within the framework of this same 
agreement, new absence certification regulations were implemented (for everyone) in 
July 2004, implying that partial sickness absence became the “default” option after 8 
weeks of sickness absence. Sickness benefits cannot be paid for more than a year. After 
that, the claimant is referred to the much less generous rehabilitation benefit (with re-
placement ratio around 66 percent).   
3.  Empirical strategy 
This section describes our methodology. We start out by presenting the statistical model 
that we use to account for sickness absence behavior, conditional on a vector of time 
varying observed covariates xit and a vector of time-invariant unobserved covariates vi. 
We then explain how we estimate the parameters of that model by means of a nonpara-
metric maximum likelihood estimator (NPMLE). Finally, we describe how we use the 
estimated model for simulation purposes.   
1.1  The model 
We model individual sickness absence propensity by means of a multivariate hazard rate 
model. The model distinguishes between “minor” (acute) and “major” (potentially 
chronic) diseases, based on the recorded diagnosis. The distinction is made on the basis 
of the aggregate duration distribution of absence spells by diagnosis, such that diagnoses 
                                                 
2 There is an upper ceiling on the sickness insurance benefits paid out be the social security system 
(corresponding to a yearly income of around 50,000 USD), but employers typically cover the wedge be-
tween the maximum social security payment and normal earnings.. 
3 Frequently absent employees need certification from the first day of absence.   8
with mean durations below 17 days are classified as minor, while diagnoses with longer 
mean durations are classified as major. According to this classification, the group of mi-
nor diseases is dominated by respiratory infections, virus diseases, and gastrointestinal 
diseases, while the group of major diseases is dominated by musculoskeletal and mental 
diseases. The resultant distributions of absence spells are described in Table 1 and in Fig-
ure 2. Around 72 percent of the absence spells are classified as major, and given their 
longer expected durations they account for as much as 93 percent of overall certified ab-
sence. While 80 percent of the minor spells lasts shorter than two weeks, this is the case 
for around 55 percent of the major spells. Roughly 10 percent of the major spells last 
longer than five months. Our classification does not correspond perfectly to actual dis-
ease “seriousness”, however, and some minor spells turn out to be long-lasting, while 
some major spells turn out to be short.  
Table 1. Sickness absence spells- minor and major diseases 
 Minor  Major 
Number of spells 2001-2005  1 052 611  2 666 316 
Mean length (days)  8.9  46.1 
Share of spells (%)  28.3  71.7 
Share of total absence days (%)  7.1  92.9 
Share right-censored spells (%)  0.44  2.05 
Note: Spells are right-censored if they are terminated without work-resumption. This typically happens 
after 12 months of absence, at death/emigration, and at the end of the observation period. 
 














































Figure 2: Survival curves for minor and major absence spells (life table estimators).  
There are three alternative states, k=1,2,3, that an individual can occupy in our 
model; attendance (k=1), absence with a minor disease (k=2) and absence with a major 
disease (k=3). A present individual is under risk of becoming absent due to either a minor 
or a major disease; hence we model these events by means of a competing risks hazard   9
rate model. Let K1 be the set of feasible destination states for individuals currently in 
state 1 and let  1 T  be the stochastic duration until one of the two possible events occur. 
The competing hazards are then defined and specified as follows: 
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where xit is a vector comprising all observed explanatory variables assumed to affect in-
dividual i’s hazard rates at time t and 12 13 (,) ii vvare time-invariant unobserved employee 
characteristics.  
  Once absent, individuals are subject to the risk of recovery and, hence, of becom-
ing present. Let { } 23 , TTbe the stochastic durations of absence in states 2 and 3, respec-
tively. The two single risk hazard rates are then defined and specified as follows: 
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where dit is a vector describing the duration of an ongoing absence spell and  21 31 (,) ii vvare 
time-invariant unobserved employee characteristics.  
  The vector of explanatory variables (xit) contains a wide range of potential ab-
sence determinants, such as age, gender, nationality, family situation, family background, 
important family events (pregnancy, divorce, death in close family), place of residence, 
educational attainment, workplace characteristics, industry, work-hours, earnings, tenure, 
local labor market conditions, panel doctor characteristics, and calendar time. We exploit 
the richness of our data and the large number of observations to avoid unjustified func-
tional form restrictions. This implies that virtually all the variables are dummy coded. For 
example, age is coded as a vector of 31 (time-varying) indicator variables 
(age=30,31,…,60), rather than as a polynomial in a single age-variable. Education is 
coded in the form of 65 dummy variables, reflecting both the length and the type of edu-
cation. Spell duration is coded by means of 28 dummy variables, allowing the piece-vice 
constant baseline hazards to differ before and after the 2004 reform. In each of these pe-
riods, there are separate dummy variables for weeks 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-26, 27-
38, 39-49, 50-52. And calendar time is coded by means of quarterly dummy variables. A 
more detailed overview of explanatory variables is provided in Appendix Table A1.    10
1.2  Estimation 
To derive the likelihood function for observed data, we split each individual’s event his-
tory into parts characterized by constant xit and unchanged state (i.e., any change in any 
explanatory variable or outcome triggers a new spell-part). Let  ,1 , 2 , 3 ji Sj =  be the set of 
observed spell parts in state j for individual i. Let  jis l denote the observed length of each 
of the spell part ji s S ∈ , and let the indicator variables  12 13 (,) is is yydenote whether a state 1 
spell part ended in a transition to state 2  12 (1 ) is y = or to state 3  13 (1 ) is y = or was censored 
12 13 (0 ) is is yy == . Similarly, let  21 31 (,) is is yyindicate whether state 2 and state 3 spell-parts 
ended in work resumption or were censored. Conditional on unobserved heterogeneity, 










11 2 1 1
2,3 2,3
11 1 11 1
2,3
( ) exp exp( ) exp( )






ii i s i tk k i i tk k i
k sS k
y
jis it j it j j i it j it j j i
js S
Lv l x v x v






=− + + ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠




where  12 13 21 31 (,,,) ii i i i vv v v v = . The total number of spell parts included in our analysis is 
around 50.5 million.
4 
Since the likelihood contribution in (3) contains unobserved variables, it cannot 
be used directly for estimation purposes. This problem may be solved by formulating a 
model for the joint distribution of unobserved heterogeneity and replace Equation (3) 
with its expectation. In order to avoid unjustified assumptions, we approximate unob-
served heterogeneity by means of a discrete distribution. Let Q be the (the a priori un-
known) number of support points in this distribution and let { } , , 1,2,... , ll vp l Q =  be the 
associated location vectors and probabilities. In terms of observed variables, the likeli-
hood function is then given as  
  () ()
11 11
[] ,     1
i
QQ NN
ii l il l v
ll ii
LE L v p L v p
== ==
== = ∑∑ ∏∏ , (4) 
 where   ( ) il Lvis given in Equation (3). Our estimation procedure is to maximize the like-
lihood function (4) with respect to all the model and heterogeneity parameters repeatedly 
                                                 
4 At the start of our data window in 2001 some employees are already absent due to sickness. 
These spells are left out of the analysis, and the individuals in question are included when/if they again 
become present. The reason for this is that exploitation of ongoing spells would involve some rather intri-
cate initial conditions problems, since the initial condition in this case not only comprises a particular state, 
but also a particular duration.   11
for alternative values of Q. The non-parametric maximum likelihood estimators 
(NPMLE) are obtained by starting out with Q=1, and then expanding the model with new 
support points until the model is “saturated” in the sense that it is no longer possible to 
increase the likelihood function by adding more points (Lindsay 1983; Heckman and 
Singer 1984). At each stage of the estimation process, we examine the appropriateness of 
an additional mass-point by means of simulated annealing (Goffe, Ferrier, and Rogers 
1994). The preferred model is then selected on the basis of the Akaike Information Crite-
rion (AIC). Monte Carlo evidence presented in Gaure, Røed and Zhang (2007) indicates 
that parameter estimates obtained this way are consistent and approximately normally 
distributed. They also indicate that the standard errors conditional on the optimal number 
of support points are valid for the unconditional model as well, and hence can be used for 
standard inference purposes. 
An implicit assumption in this model is that movements into and out of employ-
ment (and, hence, into and out of the analysis population) are exogenous with respect to 
the two modeled hazard rates, conditional on all observed explanatory variables. This as-
sumption is probably violated. However, the extraordinary rich set of observed character-
istics used in this analysis should ensure that the potential biases arising from this viola-
tion are reduced to a minimum.  
1.3  Simulation 
Once the model is estimated, it can be used for simulation purposes, both as a means to 
assess the model’s performance and as a tool for investigating the influence of particular 
variable groups on aggregate absenteeism. We generate simulated absence data by equip-
ping each employee with his/her actual observed explanatory variables at the moment of 
entry into the dataset, make a drawing of the unobserved variable vector from the esti-
mated joint heterogeneity distribution, and then let the future movements across states be 
determined by a sequence of lotteries. The probabilities entering into these lotteries are 
computed from the four predicted hazard rate profiles. These profiles are partly deter-
mined by the worker’s characteristics and partly by the economic environment, e.g., 
through the evolvement of calendar time dummy variables. In order to predict each 
worker’s long-term (steady state) absence rate, we also perform simulations based on a 
completely static infinite horizon environment. These simulations are more thoroughly 
explained in Section 5.   12
4.  Estimation results 
This section presents the estimation results. All the results are based on the preferred 
mixture model, for which the unobserved heterogeneity distribution ended up having 29 
distinct support points.
5 In total, the chosen model contains 1,702 parameters to estimate; 
hence we cannot present the results in any detail. We limit ourselves to presenting some 
key findings believed to be of general interest. Given our extensive usage of indicator 
variables, standard errors are typically of limited interest, since they essentially measure 
the statistical uncertainty relative to an arbitrarily selected reference group. Hence, for 
expository reasons we do not report standard errors or confidence intervals except were 
this is deemed to be of particular interest. The size of our dataset ensures that most pa-
rameters are estimated with great precision, and we will argue that the focus should really 
be on substantive, rather than statistical significance. Note also that many of the results 
are presented directly in the text, without reference to a table. Complete estimation results 
– with standard errors – are accessible from our web page 
www.frisch.uio.no/docs/absenteeism.html.  
1.4  The longitudinal variation in absenteeism - time and duration dependence 
We start out by assessing the estimated model’s ability to reproduce the longitudinal 
variation in actual certified absence rates and to examine the extent to which the changes 
in aggregate absenteeism over time can be explained by sorting into and out of the work-
force. The upper panel of Figure 3 compares actual monthly absence rates over time to 
the aggregate monthly absence rates obtained by simulating the employees’ absence be-
havior on the basis of the estimated model. We consider the model fit to be reasonably 
good, except that it fails to fully capture the seasonal pattern in absenteeism. The reason 
for this deficiency is that calendar time is represented in our model by quarterly, rather 
than monthly, dummy variables. Note that the low absence rates in the beginning of the 
data period reflect that we have conditioned on all employees being present at work to 
start with. This implies that aggregate absence rates are only comparable over time start-
ing from June 2002. 
                                                 
5 None of the results presented in this paper are sensitive with respect to the exact number of sup-
port-points in the heterogeneity distribution.   13



























(b) Age, gender and family situation






(c) Workplace characteristics and industry

















Figure 3.  Actual and simulated absence rates 2001-2005 (panel (a)) and the estimated contribution to 
relative changes in the aggregate absence rate by four different variable groups (panels (b)-(e)).  
Note: Panels (b)-(e) report relative changes caused by the variable groups in question. The curves are nor-
malized to unity in June 2002. 
 
Changes in aggregate absenteeism may result from changes in employees’ ab-
sence behavior and/or from changes in the composition of workers and workplaces. The 
four lower panels in Figure 3 illustrate the isolated composition-effects arising from some 
selected variable groups.
6 They show that demographic changes contributed to a small (1 
percent) decline in the aggregate absence rate during 2002, and to a small rise afterwards. 
Changes in work-hours also contributed to a decline in absenteeism during the economic 
downturn in 2002, while changes in the education and industry composition contributed 
to a somewhat larger and more trend-like decline. The key message coming out of this 
exercise, however, is that impacts of compositional changes are small over the time-
horizon covered by our analysis. Thus, the changes that occurred in absenteeism over 
these five years primarily reflected variation in each workers’ absence behavior, and not 
changes in the composition of workers and workplaces.
7 
                                                 
6 These profiles are obtained by simulating absence behaviour when only the variable group in 
question is allowed to vary over time, and then normalize the absence rate to unity in May 2002. 
7 Note that we also examine the cyclical sorting-hypothesis by including the local (municipality) 
employment rate as an explanatory variable in the model. A high local employment rate may be taken as an 
indicator that individuals with poor health have been included in the workforce; hence we may expect high 
employment to coexist with high absence rates. Our findings suggest that a higher local employment rate 
implies both higher entry and recovery rates, indicating that the marginal members of the workforce have   14
Figure 4 displays the estimated calendar time effects for each of the four hazard rates in 
our model (exp of coefficients attached to the quarterly time dummy variables). The entry 
rate into minor diagnosis is completely dominated by the seasonal pattern, and no obvi-
ous time-trend can be spotted. For the entry rate to major diagnosis, however, there ap-
pears to have been a downward shift from the third quarter of 2004, coinciding with the 
reform of the sickness absence certification regulations. Recovery rates (the two lower 
panels) also seem to have risen slightly after this reform.  
























































Figure 4. Estimated relative impacts of calendar on the four hazard rates (with 95 percent confidence 
intervals; reference is 1
st quarter 2002). 
 
The calendar time developments in the recovery rates shown in Figure 4 are 
evaluated at the beginning (first week) of absence spells. In order to assess the potential 
impacts of the 2004 reform on the recovery profiles (the duration dependence in the re-
covery hazards), we have estimated the two recovery baseline hazard rates separately be-
fore and after the reform. The result is illustrated in Figure 5, where we have scaled the 
estimated recovery profiles such that they start out at a level corresponding to the ob-
                                                                                                                                                 
more frequent – but also less serious – spells of sickness absence. We use simulations to assess whether 
higher employment increases or decreases the average absence rate, i.e. whether the positive entry or the 
negative recovery rates dominate. We find that an increase in the local employment rate from 80 to 85 per-
cent reduces the average absence rate by around 0.3 percentage points. Hence, our results do not confirm 
the idea that high employment entails a high rate of sickness absence.   15
served average recovery frequency during the first absence week. Recall that the reform 
made work attendance the “default” option after 8 weeks of sickness absence; hence we 
would expect it to raise recovery rates after 8 weeks. Whereas the recovery rates from the 
minor diseases are virtually unchanged, there is indeed a slight increase in the relative 
recovery probabilities at longer durations for the major disease diagnosis after the reform 
(although it is hardly visible in the graph, the shift is statistically significant at conven-
tional levels). However, simulations show that the quantitative importance of this shift on 
the aggregate absence rate is modest, around 0.2 percentage points (3.3 percent). In total, 
the reform appears to have shifted the absence rate downwards with approximately one 
percentage point; see Markussen (2009) for a separate analysis of this issue. 
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Figure 5. Duration dependence in recovery hazards. Before and after the reform in 2004 (log-scale on 
the horizontal axes). 
Note that the scales on the vertical axes differ between the two graphs. 
 
The baseline hazards depicted in Figure 5 illustrate that there is strong negative 
duration dependence in recovery prospects. For the average employee, the probability of 
recovering from a major disease declines from around 28 percent during the first week to 
around 5 percent after 10 weeks.  As the sickness insurance period approaches exhaustion 
after one year, the recovery hazard again increases sharply, and the weekly probability of 
returning from a major disease absence spell is never larger than during the last four 
weeks. The spikes in the recovery hazard just prior to sickness benefit exhaustion is 
reminiscent of the benefit exhaustion spike frequently encountered in unemployment du-  16
ration analyses; see, e.g., Card, Chetty, and Weber (2007) for a recent review of the lit-
erature, and Røed and Zhang (2003) for Norwegian evidence. Even though an extremely 
small fraction of absentees is directly affected by sickness benefit exhaustion (see Figure 
2), this finding indicates that financial incentives have the potential of shifting absence 
behavior quite substantially. 
1.5  Age, gender, and family background 
We now take a closer look at how various groups of explanatory variables affect entry 
and recovery hazard rates. The partial impacts of age are illustrated in Figure 6. The 
probability of entering into a sickness absence spell declines sharply with age up to 
around 45 years.  A 30 year employee has a 70 percent higher entry rate to minor disease 
absence and a 10 percent higher entry rate to major disease absence than a 45 year old 
employee, other things equal. Above 45 years, the entry rates either stabilize (minor dis-
eases) or rise (major diseases). The probability of recovering from an illness declines 
monotonously with age. Taken together, these estimates imply that the overall minor dis-
ease absence propensity declines with age up to around age 50, while major disease ab-
sence rises monotonously and significantly with age. Given that individuals’ health con-
ditions are typically assumed to deteriorate with age, we find the extremely high absence 
entry rates among young workers intriguing.
8 To the extent that absenteeism represents a 
withdrawal from unsatisfactory work conditions, the declining absence frequency by age 
may reflect that older employees have had more time to find a satisfactory job match 
(Martocchio, 1989). Moreover, systematic sorting out of the labor force by age probably 
ensures that the most absent adolescents are no longer in the work force when they reach 
their 40’s. However, our findings may also reflect that young workers are bearers of a 
new and less strict norm set, and hence have lower thresholds for claiming sick.  
                                                 
8 According to the Norwegian level of living sample survey in 2005 (provided by Statistics Nor-
way), 88 percent of individuals aged 25-44 characterize their own health as good or very good. The same 
applies for 76 percent of individuals aged 45-66.   17






















































Figure 6. Estimated relative impact of age on the four hazard rates (with 95 percent confidence in-
tervals; reference is age=43) 
  
Table 2 presents the estimated impacts of gender interacted with family situation. 
Women have much higher entry rates than men, regardless of whether we compare mar-
ried, separated/divorced or single employees, with or without children. Women’s entry 
rates to certified sickness absence exceed those of men by as much as 45-68 percent for 
minor diseases and 26-43 percent for major diseases.
9 The gender differentials in recov-
ery rates are much smaller. Women tend to recover somewhat slower than men from ma-
jor disease absence, particularly if they have children.  
Table 2. The impact of being female rather than male (percentage change in hazard rate) 
 Absence  entry  Recovery 
  To minor  To major  From minor  From major 
Being a female, by marital status and 
parenthood (reference=male) 
    
Married        
Without children  53.2  26.1  3.6  3.2 
With children  45.5  31.5  1.4  -3.7 
Separated/divorced      
Without children  67.4  38.1  3.4  4.5 
With children  63.9  43.3  2.3  0.5 
Never  married      
Without children  57.6  43.1  2.4  -4.7 
With children  57.3  35.9  2.0  -2.4 
 
                                                 
9 Note that these differences cannot be explained by either the menstrual cycle (Ichino and Mor-
etti, 2009) or by pregnancies. Menstrual pain is recorded as a separate diagnosis, and this diagnosis ac-
counts for less than 1 percent of the certified minor disease absence among females. Pregnancies are con-
trolled for through separate variables; see Section 4.6.   18
  There are large differences in absence patterns across different nationalities. Im-
migrants from EU or USA have entry rates to absence around 9 percent above those of 
natives. Immigrants from outside EU/USA have entry rates that are as much as 43 (mi-
nor) and 58 (major) percent higher than natives, ceteris paribus. Recovery rates are fairly 
similar across nationalities, with the exception that immigrants from outside EU/USA 
have 18 percent higher recovery rates from major diseases than natives. The latter finding 
reflects a general pattern that a high recovery rate is a mirror image of a high entry rate, 
probably indicating that a high entry rate signals low absence thresholds. 
In accordance with existing evidence (see, e.g., Marmot, 2004, for a recent re-
view), we find a strong social gradient in absenteeism. Even conditional on own educa-
tion, job type, income, and wealth, family background has a significant impact on the 
probability of entering into a sickness absence spell. Workers borne in families with at 
least one parent in the highest education bracket (PhD) have around nine percent lower 
probability of starting a minor disease absence spell and almost 18 percent lower prob-
ability of starting a major disease absence spell than an otherwise identical person born in 
a family with both parents in the lowest education bracket (only compulsory education). 
Income differences in the parent generation reinforce this social gradient, as the off-
spring’s rate of entry into major disease spells declines significantly with the parents’ in-
come. The parents’ health condition also seems to be transferred across generations. Indi-
cators of early death or disability of parents predict high offspring absence rates. For ex-
ample, with both parents being disabled, the offspring’s entry rate into a major disease 
spell rises by 25 percent, ceteris paribus. 
1.6  Human capital and job characteristics 
Table 3 presents selected estimates regarding the association between own educational 
attainment and absence behavior. Educational attainment sharply reduces the rates of en-
try into both minor and major disease absence. And it seems to be the level of education 
that matters – not its type. This pattern is also evident for a number of education tracks 
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Table 3. The impact of education (percentage change in hazard rates) 
 Absence  entry  Recovery 
  To minor  To major  From minor  From major 
Educational attainment; selected esti-
mates  
(reference= compulsory education only) 
    
      
General educations      
Uncompleted high school  -15.2  -21.8  3.5  3.4 
Completed high school  -25.3  -34.8  5.5  2.9 
      
Health related educations      
Uncompleted high school  -3.5  -3.8  2.8  1.3 
Completed high school  -2.6  -4.1  2.5  3.2 
College, lower level (nurses) -23.6  -25.4  0.8  -6.1 
University, higher level (doctors) -55.0  -59.6  5.7  -9.3 
PhD -68.5  -71.7  -0.8  -7.8 
      
Technical/mechanical  education      
Uncompleted high school  2.3  -0.2  1.6  1.7 
Completed high school  -8.7  -15.9  2.3  3.6 
High school w/ext.  -23.6  -35.8  3.5  0.7 
College, lower level  -40.2  -57.8  7.9  3.2 
College/University, higher level  -49.4  -69.5  10.7  1.8 
PhD -59.1  -76.7  12.2  3.5 
      
Economy and administration         
Uncompleted high school  -17.4  -24.1  4.2  1.9 
Completed high school  -28.4  -37.9  5.6  0.9 
High school w/ext.  -34.9  -48.1  6.7  2.7 
College, lower level  -43.4  -57.5  7.5  -3.3 
College/University, higher level  -48.2  -66.3  9.4  -1.1 
PhD -60.0  -76.0  1.8  -7.3 
      
Teacher education (College level) -20.3  -33.9 4.9 10.1 
 
The type of job also has a large impact on absenteeism, and entry rates typically 
vary by up to around 30 percent across major industries. Absence rates are highest in the 
manufacturing, teaching, and health care sectors, and lowest in the oil industry, retailing, 
and research and development. Absenteeism generally rises with work-hours and declines 
with earnings (given the number of work-hours). Within the group of full-time workers, 
we find that members of the upper earnings quartile have a 42 percent lower entry rate to 
major absence – and a 47 percent higher recovery rate – than members of the first earn-
ings quartile, ceteris paribus. We also find that absenteeism declines strongly with 
wealth, which probably reflects that wealth is correlated with unobserved human capital 
characteristics as well as with social background. 
Previous evidence has indicated that insecure jobs encourage workers to avoid ab-
senteeism; see Arai and Thoursie (2005) and  Ichino and Riphahn (2005). We have exam-
ined this hypothesis by using very short tenure (less than one year) as a proxy for job in-  20
security (most jobs in Norway come with a trial period of six or 12 months). However, 
we find no consistent evidence that short-tenured workers have less certified absence 
than more secure workers. Short tenure is associated with a 2.9 percent higher entry rate 
into minor diseases and a 5.7 percent lower hazard rate into major diseases.
10   
1.7  The workplace 
Small workplaces (less than 20 employees) have entry rates into certified absence that are 
20-25 percent lower than those of large workplaces, ceteris paribus. A possible interpre-
tation of this finding is that workers at small workplaces to a larger extent than workers at 
large workplaces internalize the adverse consequences of own absence. Moreover, small 
workplaces are more transparent; hence it is more difficult to be absent without anyone 
noticing. The characteristics of colleagues have a significant impact on each employee’s 
absence propensity. In particular we find that entry rates into both types of absence spells 
decline strongly with the average age of the colleagues at a workplace. The entry rates at 
workplaces with mean age above 50 years are around 8-12 percent lower than at work-
places with mean age below 40 years, ceteris paribus. Entry rates also decline with the 
average education level. These findings are all consistent with the idea that absenteeism 
is affected by local social norms; i.e., when the colleagues have characteristics implying 
low average absence propensity at the workplace, this also implies that each individual’s 
threshold for claiming sick is higher than it would have been under other circumstances. 
This conclusion does not hold for the gender composition, however. We find that a bal-
anced gender mix implies lower entry rates into major diseases than either male-
domination or female-domination. Domination by one gender is also associated with low 
reentry rates from both types of absence. A possible interpretation of these findings is 
that a balanced gender composition is conducive to the work environment. 
Workplaces with high employee turnover have approximately 6 percent higher en-
try rates into major disease absence and 2-3 percent lower recovery rates from both diag-
                                                 
10 We also exploit regional idiosyncrasies in labor market tightness to investigate the impact of job 
insecurity. Previous Norwegian evidence indicates that absenteeism vary procyclically because the threat of 
being laid off is more frightening the poorer are the chances of getting a new job (Askildsen, Bratberg, and 
Nilsen, 2005; Nordberg and Røed, 2009). Labor market tightness is represented in our model by the transi-
tion rate out of registered unemployment in the municipality. As it turns out, our findings confirm that there 
is a positive impact of labor market tightness on entry into minor diseases; a 10 percentage point increase in 
the probability of escaping unemployment raises the entry rate to minor absence by 3.3 percent. For the 
other transitions, we only find small or statistically insignificant impacts.   21
noses than workplaces with low turnover.
11 Downsizing reduces entry into minor disease 
absence (with up to 3.5 percent), but has no effect on entry into major disease absence. 
Downsizing also significantly reduces recovery rates, particularly from major disease ab-
sence (with up to 5.5 percent). The latter finding may reflect that employers going 
through downsizing have weak incentives to encourage recovery, given that the social 
security system pays the whole wage bill for long-term absentees. 
1.8  The panel doctor 
Table 4 reports the impacts of various panel doctor characteristics. A point to note is that 
workers listed with very young panel doctors (below 30 years) are significantly less ab-
sent from work than workers listed with older panel doctors. Recovery hazards also de-
cline monotonously with the doctor’s age. Female doctors seem to be “stricter” than male 
doctors. Having a female panel doctor reduces the entry rates into absence by around 2.5 
percent, ceteris paribus. The effect of the doctor’s gender is slightly larger for female 
than for male workers. Doctors sharing office with other doctors, e.g. in a medical centre, 
are stricter than doctors operating alone. Specialists are slightly stricter than non-
specialists. 
Table 4. The impacts of panel doctor characteristics (percentage change in hazard rates) 
 Absence  entry  Recovery 
  To minor  To major  From minor  From major 
A. The panel doctor’s age (reference=40-
50 years) 
    
< 30 years  -3.7   -2.6   3.5   5.4  
30 – 40 years  -1.1   -0.1   3.8   2.3  
40 – 50 years  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref. 
50 – 60 years  -0.6   -1.4   -2.9   -1.2  
> 60 years  -0.2   -3.0   -7.6   -1.7  
      
B. Female panel doctor (reference=male 
panel doctor)      
Male patient  -2.4   -2.3   0.5   -0.9  
Female patient  -2.6   -3.3   0.8   -1.3  
      
C. Panel doctor sharing office with other 
doctors (reference=operating alone)  -2.9   -1.4   0.8   0.4  
      
D. Panel doctor has a specialist educa-
tion (reference=non-specialist)  -0.4   -0.5   3.8   2.4  
 
We have also investigated the impacts of the panel doctor’s workload and com-
petitive situation (the degree of patient shortage). Our findings indicate that doctors with 
                                                 
11 The turnover rate is defined on a quarterly basis as Min(number of entries, number of exits) di-
vided by the number of employees at the start of the quarter.   22
few patients, in general, and with fewer numbers of patients than desired, in particular, 
certify less absence than doctors with many patients. The competitive situation in the 
municipality – as measured by the panel doctors’ average shortage of patients in the mu-
nicipality – seems to be of minor importance. These findings may reflect that panel doc-
tor assignment is selective. Patients are free to choose between doctors with spare capac-
ity, and they may prefer lenient to strict doctors. On the other hand, if doctors respond 
strongly to financial incentives, we would expect panel doctors with few patients to be 
particularly lenient. Our results are more in line with the selection-of-doctors hypothesis 
than with the doctor-respond-to-incentives hypothesis. 
1.9  Family events 
We now turn to the impacts of important family events, such as pregnancies, separa-
tions/divorces, and the death of a close family member (spouse, child, mother, or father). 
All the impacts are estimated dynamically, i.e., we investigate the time profile of impacts 
on the hazard rates prior to and after the event in question actually occurs. These profiles 
are estimated non-parametrically, using time varying indicator variables that capture the 
effect of the time distance to the event in question (measured in weeks or months be-
fore/after). Figure 7 presents the estimated impacts on entry into the major diagnosis (it 
turned out that the events in question only had minor impacts on the other hazard rates).  





































(a) Pregnancy and child birth










































































(c) Losing a child






































(d) Losing a spouse

















































































Figure 7. The estimated impacts of family shocks on the hazard rate to a major disease absence spell 
(with 95 percent confidence intervals; reference is no family shock).    23
 
Pregnancy has the almost immediate effect of five-doubling the rate of entry into 
major diseases absence spell; see panel a). The effect reaches a maximum two months 
before birth, at which point the entry rate is 15 times higher than before the pregnancy, 
ceteris paribus.  The process of separation/divorce also entails increased risk of entry into 
major disease absence spell; see panel b). The impact is largest around 4-8 weeks prior to 
separation (at which point the entry rate is raised by a factor of 2.3), and it declines rap-
idly after the couple has actually split.  
The loss of a close family member clearly has a huge impact of the entry into a ma-
jor disease absence spell, see panels c)-f). In particular, the loss of a child or a spouse 
raises the hazard dramatically, by a factor of 150 and 10, respectively. But the loss of par-
ents also entails significantly higher absence rates, particularly during the six months 
prior to the parent’s death. This finding suggests that the demand for informal care may 
constitute a burden for employed offspring during the terminal phase of parents’ lives, in 
line with recent findings reported by Fevang, Kverndokk, and Røed (2008).  
The large impact of family events on absenteeism is consistent with the interview-
based finding reported by Carlsen (2008) that panel doctors sometimes certify that em-
ployees are sick even when this is not strictly true. This may reflect that the sickness ab-
sence insurance system in Norway has developed into a more general “justified absence” 
insurance system, where physicians certify sickness to help employees cope with a diffi-
cult life situation. 
1.10  Unobserved heterogeneity 
Unobserved heterogeneity affects the four hazard rates through a joint discrete distribu-
tion of worker-specific intercepts, as reflected in the 29-support-points discrete distribu-
tion. By construction, unobserved covariates are orthogonal to the observed covariates. 
As we show in the next section, unobserved heterogeneity turns out to account for more 
of the cross-sectional variation in absence propensities than all the observed covariates 
taken together. Hence, it may be of interest to take a closer look at the structure of unob-
served heterogeneity. Table 5 presents the estimated rank correlation (Kendall’s τ) be-  24
tween the four unobserved intercepts.
12 There is a strong positive correlation in the minor 
(v12) and major (v13) absence entrance propensities. There is apparently no systematic di-
rect relationship between unobserved entry and recovery propensities. We find, however, 
that workers with a high probability of entering minor absence (v12) tend to have a high 
recovery rate from major absence (v31), and that workers with high probability of entering 
major absence (v13) have a low recovery rate from minor absence (v31). 
Table 5: Estimated rank correlation between the four unobserved covariates (Kendall’s τ) 
  v12 v 13 v 21 v 31 
v12  1 0.678  -0.055  0.195 
v13   1  -0.272  0.018 
v21     1  0.645 
Note: Rank correlation is calculated from the 29-points discrete distribution. See footnote for details.  
5.  The cross-sectional variation in steady state absence rates 
The purpose of this section is to decompose the variation in absenteeism between em-
ployees into its appropriate observed and unobserved determinants. This cannot be done 
on the basis of recorded absence at a particular point in time, since each employee is then 
either absent or present, and little information is revealed regarding the underlying ab-
sence propensities. We should therefore clearly examine the absence behavior over some 
period of time. As the time-period becomes longer, the random nature of health shocks 
becomes less important, and each employee approaches an average absence rate corre-
sponding to his/her intrinsic absence propensity. The influence of window length on the 
observed variance in mean individual absence rates is illustrated in the two upper panels 
of Figure 8. As the time window is extended, the cross sectional variance in absence rates 
declines. We observe the same pattern whether we look at actual absence behavior or at 
the absence behavior simulated on the basis of our statistical model, although the simu-
lated data clearly underrates the cross-sectional variance of major disease absence some-
what.  
                                                 
12 Kendall’s τ is computed on the basis of all possible pairs of workers (i,j) that can be formed 
from the heterogeneity distribution. A pair { } ( , ),( , ) , , 12,13,21,31, ki li kj lj vv vv k l =  is concordant with respect 
to variables (k,l) if () ( ) 0 ki kj li lj vvvv −− > and discordant if () ( ) 0 ki kj li lj vvvv − −< . Let ckl be the number of 













= ∑ of pairs drawn from the same location vector.    25



































































Figure 8. Variation in individual absence rates.  
Note: The upper panels illustrate the distribution of mean individual absence rates by length of the time 
window considered. The lower panel shows the distribution of steady state absence rates. 
 
1.11  Steady state absence rates 
Based on our estimated model, we can predict each employee’s long-run absence propen-
sity, defined formally as the absence rate that prevails as the time window goes towards 
infinity. We compute these steady state absence rates by means of the limiting distribu-
tion of the markovian transition matrix (Taylor and Karlin, 1998, p. 207) that can be con-
structed on the basis of each employee’s four predicted hazard rates, taking into account 
that recovery probabilities vary with absence duration.
13 In this exercise, all explanatory 
variables (except spell duration) are held constant at the level prevailing at a particular 
point in time, implying that the steady state absence rates can be interpreted as the ex-
pected fraction of time spent in sickness absence over an infinitely long time horizon, 
given that no changes occur in individual characteristics or in environmental factors. The 
steady state absence rates examined below are computed from the predicted hazard rates 
in the third quarter of 2002, but the cross-sectional decomposition is not at all sensitive 
                                                 
13 From the covariates and the estimated coefficients we construct one transition matrix for each 
individual in the sample. The limiting distribution then gives us the expected share of a persons time spent 
in each state.  Formally, there are more than 100 states in our transition matrix, since recovery rates are 
allowed to vary by duration.    26
with respect to this particular selection of point in time. Looking at the bottom bars in the 
upper panels of figure 8, we conclude that the steady state variance is roughly half of the 
five-year variance for both minor and major absence. The reported variances imply that 
the standard deviations in steady state absence rates are around 8 percent for major ab-
sence and 1 percent for minor absence. The mean (median) steady state absence rates are 
0.6 (0.3) percent for minor disease diagnoses and 5.9 (3.2) percent for major disease di-
agnoses. The lower panel of Figure 8 describes the distributions of steady state absence 
rates in more detail. While around 80 percent of the employees are absent less than 1 per-
cent of their potential working days due to minor diseases, the major disease absence 
propensity is subject to large variation, with as much as 10 percent of the employees hav-
ing steady state absence rates above 15 percent.  
1.12  Variance decomposition of steady state absence rates 
We now turn to the issue of decomposing the variation in absence rates that our model 
does account for into its various sources, and to disentangle direct impacts of explanatory 
variables from impacts operating through correlation with other variables. Let  ˆki a  be in-
dividual i’s predicted steady state absence rate corresponding to state k (k=2,3) (minor, 
major) We suppress the time-subscript here to emphasize the steady state nature of the 
calculations; all time-varying covariates are held fixed. Let  { } , ii i zx v =  be the complete 
set of explanatory variables determining  ˆki a , and let  ci z be a subset of these variables. We 
can now investigate how much of the variance in  ˆki a which is accounted for by the vari-
able subset  c z based on the law of total variance, i.e.,  
  [ ] [ ] ˆˆ ˆ var var | var | ki ki c ki c c c aE a z E a z ⎡ ⎤ =+ ⎣ ⎦ , (5) 
The fraction of total variance accounted for by  c z is thus 
[] () ()
1 ˆˆ var | var ki c ki c Ea z a
− ⎡⎤
⎣⎦ . Part A of Table 6 reports the percent of overall variance 
across individuals – in total, minor, and major absence – that is attributable to the vari-
ance between the different categories that can be established on the basis of various ex-
planatory variable groups. The number of categories varies a lot across the different vari-
able groups. For example, for the variable group “age”, we simply divide the population 
into 31 groups depending on age measured in years. For the variable group family back-
ground, on the other hand, we construct 280 categories based on all possible combina-  27
tions of the different family background covariates. And for workplaces and panel doc-
tors, we let each workplace and doctor constitute a separate category. The results suggest 
that job characteristics such as wages, work-hours and seniority account for 11.5 percent 
of the variance in expected steady state absence rates, while the identity of the workplace 
accounts for 7.9 and the worker’s educational attainment for 7.4 percent. The most im-
portant factor, however, is unobserved heterogeneity, which according to our model ac-
counts for as much as 66 percent of the variation in steady state absence rates.  
Table 6: Percent of cross-sectional variance in steady state absence rates attributable to different vari-
able groups 
Variable group 
(number of categories 
included within each 
variable group) 
A. Gross variance de-
composition: Percent of 
total variance ac-
counted for by variable 
group 
B. Partial variance 
decomposition: Percent 
of total variance ac-
counted for by variable 
group 
C. Partial variance 
decomposition: Percent 
of total variance ac-
counted for by fixed 
effects* 
  Total  Minor Major Total  Minor Major Total  Minor Major 
Age  (31)  0.8 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.4       
Family  background  (280)  2.4 1.0 2.4 0.6 0.3 0.6       
Gender and family situa-
tion (13)  5.2 2.5 5.2 2.2 2.3 1.9       
Education  (65)  7.4 1.7 7.5 2.9 1.8 2.7       
Place  of  residence  (99)  1.2 0.9 1.4 0.7 1.0 0.7       
Job characteristics 
(wage, hours, seniority) 
(25) 
11.5 1.8 12.1 9.1  0.9  9.7       
Local  labor  market  (10) 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0       
Country  of  origin  (3)  0.2 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.1       
Workplaces (3820)  7.9  3.0  8.0 0.7 0.9 0.7 3.5 3.3 3.6 
Panel doctor (3522)  2.1  1.4  2.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 2.0 2.4 1.9 
Unobserved heterogene-
ity (29)  66.0 76.1 64.8 66.1 81.4 64.5       
*Based on results from a separate model with fixed workplace and panel doctor effects; se text. 
 
These fractions clearly reflect a combination of sorting on the conditioning vari-
ables and their possible causal effects on absence behavior. For example, the fraction of 
absence variance accounted for by workplaces partly reflects that different workplaces 
recruit different workers and partly that the absence behavior of each worker is affected 
by workplace characteristics. Our multivariate model gives us the opportunity to elimi-
nate sorting attributable to other factors, and hence to assess the partial influence of par-
ticular (groups of) variables. Assume that we wish to assess the partial influence of a sub-
set of observed variables xc. Let x-c denote the remaining observed characteristics. We 
then write the four predicted hazards as  ˆˆ ˆ ( , , ) exp( )exp( ) ki ci ci ki ci jkc ci jk c ki x xv x x v θβ β −− − + = . 
To “remove” all sources of variation other than those caused by xc, we compute steady 
state absence rates for all employees with the proportionality factors 




ci jk c ki N i x v β −− = + ∑ .   28
This implies that we compute the steady state absence rate as a function of xc for workers 
who are representative along other dimensions. Let  ˆ |, ki c c az z −  be worker i’s steady state 
absence rate predicted this way. We then compute the partial variance contribution from 
variable group zc as  [] () ()





Part B of Table 6 reports the results from the partial variance decomposition, i.e., 
the fraction of variance explained by a given variable group when all other variables are 
held fixed at a “representative” level. We first note that the fraction of the variance ex-
plained by unobserved characteristics remains virtually unchanged. This is exactly what 
we would expect, since unobserved heterogeneity by construction is distributed inde-
pendently of all other covariates; hence there is no systematic sorting on unobserved het-
erogeneity.
14 For the other covariate groups, however, the partial influence is typically 
much smaller than indicated by their gross influence. The only observed variable group 
still accounting for a major part of the variance is the one reflecting job characteristics 
(work-hours and wages). Workplaces and panel doctors no longer seem to matter very 
much. There are two possible interpretations of this latter finding. The first is that work-
places and doctors have little influence on absence behavior and that the large variation 
in absence rates across workplaces and panel doctors solely results from employee sort-
ing. The second interpretation is that observed workplace and doctor covariates (see the 
Appendix) do not appropriately represent the true variation in workplace characteristics 
and doctor practices. 
1.13  Variance decomposition based on a fixed effects model 
To assess this latter hypothesis, we estimated an additional version of the hazard rate 
model outlined in Section 3, this time with all observed workplace and panel doctor char-
acteristics replaced by workplace and panel doctor dummy variables. To make the esti-
mation of this model feasible and to avoid too much noise in the estimated workplace and 
panel doctor fixed effects, we dropped all employees in workplaces with less than 100 
employees or with panel doctors with less than 100 employed patients. This model never-
theless implied estimation of as much as 35,000 parameters. Given the computational 
challenge, we were not able to include unobserved heterogeneity in this model. The esti-
mated parameters from the fixed effects model were in turn used to compute a new set of 
                                                 
14 Note, however, that this independence result will not hold exactly, since the relationship be-
tween explanatory variables and steady state absence rate is non-linear.   29
steady state absence rates. And again, we calculated the variance in representative em-
ployees’ predicted steady state absence rates, conditional on workplace and panel doctor, 
respectively (as explained in the previous subsection). The results are reported in part C 
of Table 6. Note that we relate the variance generated by workplaces and panel doctors in 
the fixed effects model with the total variance generated from the model with unobserved 
heterogeneity included (based on the full population), but without fixed effects; hence 
this exercise does not constitute a valid variance decomposition. The reason why we do it 
this way is that the overall variance in steady state absence rates drops enormously when 
we do not account for unobserved heterogeneity, hence the “explained part” rises accord-
ingly for all variable groups. To make the numbers in Table 6 directly comparable, we 
find it most illuminating to relate all the between-group variances to the same total vari-
ance.  
The results from the fixed effects model show that there is a significant variation 
in steady state absence rates across workplaces and that this variation cannot fully be ac-
counted for by sorting. Yet, our workplace dummy variables do not explain more than 
around 3.5 percent of the overall variance in steady state absence rates, while panel doc-
tor dummies explain around 2.0 percent. A comparison of these numbers with the gross 
variance contributions reported in part A of the table indicates that while sorting accounts 
for roughly half of the variance in absence rates across workplaces, it accounts for virtu-
ally nothing of the variance across panel doctors.
15 
1.14  The roles of workplaces and physicians revisited 
Although workplaces and physicians are responsible for a modest part of the overall vari-
ance in steady state absence rates, their behavior does have a significant impact on absen-
teeism. Based on estimates from the fixed effects model, Figure 9 shows how the long-
term absence rate of a representative worker changes as he/she moves from the work-
places and doctors associated with lowest absence rates towards the workplaces and doc-
tors associated with highest absence rates. These partial – and potentially causal – effects 
are compared with the actual distribution of five-year average absence rates observed in 
the data (reproduced from Figure 1). Since sampling-error alone clearly generates a 
purely spurious difference between workplaces and panel doctors in the fixed-effects 
                                                 
15 Note, however, that by focusing on large workplaces only (more than 100 employees), we dis-
regard an important source of workplace heterogeneity, since the analysis in Section 4.4 revealed substan-
tial differences between large and small workplaces.   30
model, we also provide two “placebo” distribution curves. These have been generated by 
re-estimating the fixed effects model with counterfactual random-assignment of work-
places and panel doctors; i.e., we have constructed artificial workplace and panel doctor 
indicator variables that by definition have no effect on absenteeism. 
 
Figure 9. The distribution of absence rates across workplaces and panel doctors. 
Note: The graphs are based on actual five-year averages and on steady state absence rates calculated from a 
fixed effects model (without unobserved heterogeneity). 
 
It is clear from these graphs that even though a large part of the absence variation 
across firms is caused by sorting (and arbitrariness resulting from the limited time-
window available for comparison of actual absence rates), a significant workplace-effect 
remains when all other variables are controlled for. Moving from the 10
th to the 90
th per-
centile in the estimated workplace effect distribution raises steady state absence rate from 
around 4.2 to 7.8 percent, ceteris paribus; i.e., by 86 percent. In the corresponding pla-
cebo estimation, the difference is 35 percent. Hence, we conclude that most of the esti-
mated variation across workplaces is really causal.  
Panel doctors also seem to have a significant impact on their patients’ absence 
behavior. Moving from the 10
th to the 90
th percentile in the panel doctor effect distribu-
tion raises the representative employee’s absence rate from 4.5 to 7.1 percent; i.e., by 58   31
percent. In the placebo estimation, the difference is only 17 percent. Hence, again, most 
of the variation across panel doctors seems to be causal.  
6.  Discussion and conclusion 
The results presented in this paper show that the vast majority of employees (80 percent) 
on average will be absent (certified by a doctor) less than 1 percent of their working days 
due to minor – and easily verifiable – “everyday”-diseases, such as respiratory infections 
and virus diseases. The contribution made by this type of absence to the overall variance 
in absence rates is minimal. By contrast, absence due to potentially more serious – and 
less verifiable – diseases, such as musculoskeletal and mental disorders, are extremely 
unequally distributed across employees, and as much as10 percent of the workforce can 
expect to be absent more than 15 percent of the time. Most of this variation remains “un-
explained” in our statistical analysis, however, despite our access to an extraordinary rich 
set of explanatory variables covering employees, their workplaces, their doctors, and the 
economic environments they operate in. Yet, we do identify empirical regularities that 
shed light on the anatomy absenteeism, and on the roles that workers, firms, doctors, and 
certification regulations, may have in bringing it down.  
  Although most of the variation in absenteeism across workplaces reflects em-
ployee sorting, large differences remain when we control for sorting and random varia-
tion. These differences can only to a limited extent be explained by observed workplace 
characteristics. We find, however, that each worker’s absence behavior is affected by the 
characteristics of colleagues, suggesting that the development of workplace-specific so-
cial norms is a part of the story.  
  Physicians’ absence certification practices also have a significant impact on pa-
tients’ absence behavior, and simply switching to a new panel doctor may cause large 
shift in an employee’s absence propensity. This clearly illustrates the large scope for 
judgment regarding the use of rest as an appropriate treatment for many long-term ills, 
like musculoskeletal and mental diseases. Again, we have difficulties identifying ob-
served doctor-characteristics that can explain the variation in certification practices. We 
do find, however, that strict doctors tend to have few patients, and often fewer than they 
actually desire. We also find that strictness declines with the doctor’s age, and that fe-
male doctors are stricter than male doctors. We interpret the estimated calendar time pro-
files in the sickness absence entry and recovery hazards as convincing evidence that the   32
2004-reform in certification regulations – with larger emphasis on activation require-
ments during sickness absence periods – did cause a significant drop in absenteeism.  
A somewhat surprising result is that the frequency of both types of absence spells 
decline strongly with age up to around 45 years, even when we control for all the factors 
typically assumed to cause higher absence among younger employees, such as responsi-
bility for own children and care-needing parents. We also find that each employee’s ab-
sence propensity declines with the average age of the colleagues at the workplace. Taken 
together, these findings suggest that younger employees have lower thresholds for claim-
ing sick than older employees, ceteris paribus.  This may either indicate that social norms 
regulating the exploitation of sickness absence insurance are weaker among young than 
old workers, or that such norms are about to deteriorate. We are also surprised by the 
large difference in absenteeism between men and women that remains after we have con-
trolled for factors such as children, pregnancies, education, occupation, and pay. Depend-
ing on family situation and type of sickness, females’ entry rates to certified sickness ab-
sence spells are between 33 and 75 percent higher than those of similar males.  
  In line with existing evidence we identify a strong “social gradient” in sickness 
absence behavior. The gradient prevails regardless of whether we measure status by fam-
ily background, own educational attainment, occupation, wealth, or pay. Higher social 
status is always associated with lower sickness absence. A particularly interesting feature 
of the relationship between education and absenteeism is that the level of education 
seems to be much more important than its type, suggesting that there is a general “educa-
tion effect” operating over and above the type of job that the education qualifies for. 
  We find strong evidence that the sickness insurance system is exploited exten-
sively to offer employees a respite from work in relation to traumatic personal events, 
such as marriage dissolution, seriously ill (dying) parents, and the loss of close family 
members. This may to some extent reflect that these events actually cause sickness. But it 
is also likely to reflect that sickness certification is used as a sort of social insurance of 
last resort. Sickness absence also rises dramatically during pregnancies. Taken together, 
these findings suggest that the sickness insurance system effectively insures employees 
against a broad range of circumstances that make it difficult to go to work, despite that 
the legislation explicitly states that it covers own diagnosed sickness only.  
  Given that the earnings of virtually all employees in Norway are 100 percent in-
sured against sickness absence for up to one year, there is limited scope for assessing ab-
sence responsiveness with respect to financial incentives. After one year of absence,   33
however, those who do not return to work are transferred to the less generous “rehabilita-
tion benefit”, which on average is associated with an income drop around 35 percent. We 
find a huge rise in the recovery probability at this point; for a typical employee, the 
weakly recovery probability rises from around 5 to almost 30 percent during the very last 
weeks of the sickness insurance period. This response clearly indicates that there is no 
such thing as a deterministic relationship between health and absence. Insurance institu-
tions and panel doctor behavior matter. And so do the economic incentives of the em-
ployee. 
  Despite that we have exploited an extraordinary rich dataset – with almost 400 
explanatory variables characterizing employees, workplaces, doctors, and economic envi-
ronments – most of the cross-sectional variation in absenteeism is ultimately “explained” 
by unobserved time-invariant individual characteristics. To the extent that these charac-
teristics are not only unobserved by us (the researchers), but also by economic agents, 
their explanatory power provides a rationale for statistical discrimination in hiring poli-
cies, whereby employers use observed sickness absence behavior as a screening device; 
see, e.g,. Amilon and Wallette (2009). 
References 
Amilon, A, and Wallette, M. (2009) Work Absence - A Signalling Factor for Tempo-
rary Workers? Labour, Vol. 23, No. 1, 171–194. 
Arai, M. and Thoursie, P. S. (2005) Incentives and selection in cyclical absenteeism, 
Labour Economics, Vol. 12, No. 2, 269-280. 
Askildsen, J. E., Bratberg, E., and Nilsen, Ø. A. (2005) Unemployment, Labour Force 
Composition and Sickness Absence. A Panel Data Study. Health Economics 
Vol. 14, No. 11, 1087-1101. 
Bonato, L. and Lusinyan, L. (2004) Work Absence in Europe. IMF Working Paper 
04/193 (www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2004/wp04193.pdf) 
Card, D., Chetty, R. and Weber, A. (2007) The Spike at Benefit Exhaustion: Leaving 
the Unemployment System or Starting a New Job? American Economic Re-
view, Vol. 97, No. 2 (PAP), 113-118. 
Carlsen, B. (2008) Dobbeltmoralens voktere? Intervjuer med fastleger om sykemel-
ding. Tidsskrift for Velferdsforskning, Vol. 11, No. 4, 259-275.  
Fevang, E., Kverndokk, S, and Røed, K. (2008) Informal Care and Labor Supply. IZA   34
Discussion Paper No. 3717. 
Gaure, S., Røed, K. and Zhang, T. (2007) Time and Causality – A Monte Carlo 
Evaluation of the Timing-of-Events Approach. Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 
141, 1159–1195. 
Goffe, W.L., G.D. Ferrier, and Rogers, J. (1994) Global Optimization of Statistical 
Functions with Simulated Annealing. Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 60, 65-
99. 
Heckman, J. and Singer, B. (1984) The Identifiability of the Proportional Hazard 
Model. Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 51, 231-241. 
Henrekson, M. and Persson, M. (2004) The Effects on Sick Leave of Changes in the 
Sickness Insurance System. Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 22, 87-113. 
Ichino, A. and Riphahn, R.T. (2005) The Effect of Employment Protection on Worker 
Effort: Absenteeism During and After Probation. Journal of the European 
Economic Association, Vol. 3, No. 1, 120-143. 
Ichino, A. and Moretti, E. (2009) Biological Gender Differences, Absenteeism and the 
Earning Gap, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, Vol. 1, No. 1, 
183-218. 
Johansson, P. and Palme, M. (2002) Assessing the Effect of Public Policy on Worker 
Absenteeism. Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 37, No. 2, 381-409. 
Lindsay, B. G. (1983) The Geometry of Mixture Likelihoods: A General Theory. The 
Annals of Statistics, Vol. 11, 86-94. 
Markussen, S. (2009) Closing the gates? Evidence from a natural experiment on phy-
sicians’ sickness certification. In progress. 
Marmot, M. (2004) The Status Syndrome. How Social Standing Affects Our Health 
and Longevity. Time Books, New York. 
Martocchio, J. J. (1989) Age-related Differences in Employee Absenteeism: A Meta-
Analysis. Psychology and Aging, Vol. 4, No. 4, 409-414. 
Nordberg, M. and Røed, K. (2009) Economic Incentives, Business Cycles, and Long-
Term Sickness Absence. Industrial Relations, Vol. 48, No. 2, 203-230. 
Ruhm, C. J. (2000) Are Recessions Good for you Health? Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, Vol. 115, 617-650. 
Røed, K. and Zhang, T. (2003) Does Unemployment Compensation Affect Unem-
ployment Duration? The Economic Journal, Vol. 113, 190-206.   35
Taylor, H. M. and Karlin. S. (1998): An introduction to stochastic modelling, Aca-
demic Press   36
Appendix 
Table A1. Overview of explanatory variables 
I. Demographic 
factors 
Gender (2 dummy variables, interacted with marital status and presence of chil-
dren below 12 years of age) 
Age (31 dummy variables) 
Nationality (3 dummy variables) 
County (20 dummy variables) 




Parents’ education (8 dummy variables) 
Parents’ health – indicators for early disability or death (6 dummy variables) 
Parents’ income (6 dummy variables) 
 
III. Current family 
situation  
Marital status (3 dummy variables, interacted with gender and presence of chil-
dren below 12 years of age) 
Earnings relative to the spouse (3 dummy variables, interacted with gender) 





Death in close family (36 dummy variables, covering periods prior to and after 
decease of spouse, parent or child) 
Divorce (17 dummy variables) 
Pregnancy (17 dummy variables) 
 
V. Own human 
capital and job 
characteristics 
Length and type of own education; (65 dummy variables) 
Earnings and work hours (13 dummy variables) 
Wealth (5 dummy variables) 
 
VI. Job security 
 
Tenure (2 dummy variables) 




Industry/sector (62 dummy variables) 
Size (2 dummy variables) 
Turnover (6 dummy variables) 
Ongoing and completed downsizing/upsizing (12 dummy variables) 
Age composition of workforce (6 dummy variables) 
Gender composition of workforce (6 dummy variables) 
Education composition of workforce (6 dummy variables) 
Participation in IWA, private and public sector (4 dummy variables) 
 
VIII. Sorting of 
the workforce 
 
Local employment rate (1 scalar variable) 
IX. The panel 
doctor 
Number of patients (8 dummy variables) 
Shortage of patients in municipality (4 dummy variables) 
Deviations from the desired number of patients (6 dummy variables) 
Specialty (2 dummy variables) 
Co-practice (2 dummy variables) 
Age (5 dummy variables) 
Gender (4 dummy variables, interacted with gender of patient) 
Numbers of doctors per capita in municipality (6 dummy variables) 
 
X. Time   Quarter (19 dummy variables) 
 
XI Spell duration  Piece-vice constant baseline hazard (28 duration dummy variables) 
 
Note: The reported dummy variable numbers include the reference categories. 